But the role they play cannot be the role of providing the sensation of seeing a gesture! Because, if the firing of mirror neurons provided the sensation of recognizing gestures, one would have to postulate some magical sensation-imbuing power to such neurons (or, to the networks that those neurons are connected to). They presumably provide information to the brain circuits which control the multifarious things that macaque monkeys can potentially do when they act in response to gestures. The second claim about representations that we reject concerns perceptual consciousness: that seeing could be a matter of having certain kinds of representations in the head. The existence of representations of the environment are neither sufficient nor necessary for seeing. That they are not sufficient is shown by consideration of the fact that, though people have very nice representations of the environment in the form of the images on their retinas, having the retinal image does not make people see. Seeing lies in the making use of the representation, not in the having of the representation. The brain may abstract information in the environment into a form that can be used in an open-ended range of applications, as Van Gulick says. But just having those abstract multi-purpose representations does not account for the what-it-is-like of seeing. But finding iconic information in the low level, or middle-level, visual system does not explain why the world looks iconic to us. An example of where our approach to the question of internal representations finds support is in the domain of motor control, as pointed out by Smeets & Brenner. If one takes the view that seeing a moving ball is making an internal representation of it, one is easily led to the misconception that this representation should resemble what a physicist would construct, that is, a representation where distance, position, speed, and time are linked by coherent physical laws. It then becomes problematic to understand how, as in the Duncker and waterfall illusions and in the flash lag effect, perceived position and perceived speed seem not to be coherently linked, or why size illusions affect lifting force but not grip aperture (cf. On the other hand, such findings are easier to comprehend under our view, according to which perception involves assimilating possibly independently acquired sensorimotor contingencies which have no necessary internal consistency. Velichkovsky & Pannasch also provide an example of an oculomotor distractor effect which may support our view. Lacquaniti & Zago provide further supporting data for the idea that different, more or less independent sensorimotor loops are used in perception: judgments of size and distance of moving objects constitute one type of visual perception, but another kind of visual perception, ruled by different sensorimotor loops, is involved in catching objects. Curiously, Lacquaniti & Zago take this to be contrary to our theory, when in fact it is exactly what we predict. This would be difficult to comprehend on a physicist-type view of the representation of the world. Let us also address an interesting apparent paradox pointed out by Tatler and by Scholl & Simons. These commentators argue that the notion of sensorimotor contingency actually requires internal representations: after all, say these commentators, in order to register a change in sensory input when a body motion is made, an internal trace (representation! We agree that the visual system stores information from moment to moment, and to some extent from saccade to saccade, and this is what is used to evaluate changes. But these changes are generally not available to awareness, and this stored information is not what is seen! What we do believe is that certain arguments about the neural basis of experience seem to rely on mistakes just like the mistake of supposing that to see red there must be red neurons. The brain in consciousness the role of the brain in perceptual consciousness is another topic on which we have drawn much criticism. Many commentators misunderstand us as denying that the brain is causally necessary for perceptual consciousness. Lamme & Landman ask whether anything other than neural events could explain consciousness and they propose that reentrant processes can do the job. Bach-y-Rita & Hasse complain that we seem to be throwing the brain out with the bath water, and suggest the importance of reentrant brain mechanisms as contributing to perceptual consciousness. Revonsuo says that consciousness is a real biological phenomenon in the brain, and notes that dreaming is proof that only the brain, with no input from outside, is necessary for perceptual awareness. Rees & Frith suggest that the superior parietal lobule is a brain locus that correlates consistently with awareness. It seems probable that only a dualist could claim the brain plays no role in consciousness, and we are not dualists. Our claim, rather, is that many neuroscientists seem to be looking in the wrong direction for an account of the brain-basis of consciousness.
The dendritic arbor that satisfies these specifications is three-dimensional with straight dendrites arranged symmetrically about the cell body (figure 13. The arbor is sparse; therefore, straight axons traversing it from all angles will rarely make multiple contacts-except for close neighbors whose axons branch densely near the origin of the dendritic arbor, which is also dense (Markram et al. And by tailoring its arbor for each cortical layer, a neuron can select different repertoires (figure 13. This simple scheme allows the many types of neuron present in each cortical layer to establish their unique connectivity repertoires at least dendritic cost. Sparsity in three dimensions is far greater than apparent in this two-dimensional projection parallel to the cortical surface. Dendritic arbor assumes a different shape in each layer (a, b, P) and therefore selects a different repertoire from the axons in that layer. Both drawings are from human infant, a few days postnatal on left, and a month postnatal on right. Overall, the number of types with different connectional repertoires and different targets can be on the order of 100. This scheme is general in that it works wherever a circuit needs to provide many types with a rich connectivity repertoire. Cerebral Cortex the cerebral cortex is roughly 1 mm thick, twice the thickness of cerebellar cortex, and instead of three layers, there are at least six (figure 13. Dark cell bodies are surrounded by pale regions of circuitry (dendrites, axons, synapses). Largest cell bodies with thicker axons are sparse and located deep, near white matter, whereas the smaller cell bodies with thinner axons are dense and located high, far from white matter. Whereas cerebellar axonal and dendritic arbors are linear or flat (one- or two-dimensional), the cerebral axonal and dendritic arbors tend to be dense near their origin and spread out with distance (three-dimensional). Thus, the circuit layout matches in many respects what is optimal for high connectivity repertoires and a high ratio of potential to actual contacts. Because cerebral circuits are built from three-dimensional components, the basic design does not require folding. Thus, the unit circuits of cerebellar and cerebral cortex, despite glaring differences, use similar numbers of neurons and occupy similar volumes. The unit circuit is designed to maximize the number of potential connections that can be made within its volume. For densely connecting the cerebral three-dimensional circuit, branching axon arbors with en passant contacts reduce wire volume by 300-fold, and dendritic arbors reduce volume by another 50-fold. Clearly, this layout to maximize connectivity repertoire is efficient, but can it serve all cortical circuits Cortical neurons need to detect specific sorts of correlation: in V1, an edge; in V2, a corner; in ventral stream areas, a face (chapter 12). This involves integrating across progressively wider expanses but still using single, insecure synapses so that each type can preserve a sparse signal. Moreover, cortical neurons in all these areas need the capacity to change their connections-to resculpt their circuitry-in response to shifts in correlated input (chapter 14). This allows progressively broader integration by individual neurons and maintains their connectivity repertoire per dendritic length across scales (Wen et al. Cortical interfaces (input/output tracts) the cerebral cortex takes its main input from thalamic clusters that have substantially sparsified the signal (chapter 12). For example, input rates to visual cortex are scaled-down from the optic nerve rates (figure 11. The thinnest thalamic axons reach the uppermost cortical layer, taking the longest course through gray matter, whereas the thicker ones branch in the middle, taking the shortest course (figure 12. The smallest pyramidal neurons locate in the upper layers so their thin axons can track downward through the circuitry with least interference (figure 13. Then comes a stratum of larger pyramidal neurons with thicker axons, but the cells are sparser, also reducing interference. Pyramidal axons, upon entering the white matter, turn to course tangentially toward other cortical areas. However, the smaller neurons distribute densely (like cerebellar granule cells) and receive many thick axons (like cerebellar mossy fibers); whereas the larger neurons distribute sparsely (like cerebellar Purkinje neurons).
Equines should be evaluated individually regarding training for specific activities and services, conditioning, weight carrying ability and specific limitations. Outside evaluations from qualified professionals, such as veterinarians, are helpful to objectively document. What are the criteria used to determine whether a potential participant qualifies Consider physical, cognitive and behavioral characteristics of the participants the center is evaluating. It is very important that the decision to deny a person participation-whether due to issues such as obesity, a behavior problem, communication difficulty or a condition where riding might be contraindicated-is made fairly, based on a predetermined policy and consistently enforced to prevent accusations of bias on the part of the organization. Standards for Certification & Accreditation 2018 tions of participants should be in writing and contain detailed explanations of specific conclusions. Indicating that an equestrian activity "would be unsafe" in a notation is not sufficiently detailed. Explaining that the facility does not have staff and volunteers capable of handling the uncontrolled 150 lb. Safety concerns should also address the well-being of the personnel, volunteers and other participants at the center. For example, if the behavior of an individual participant is such that he/she imposes undue risk to sidewalkers who are otherwise trained, or that his/her behavior may trigger a fight or flight response in the horse that could injure other individuals, then the potential risk may warrant exclusion from participation. Unfortunately, risk to the horse is not given strong bias but safety of all humans is paramount. Reasonable Accommodations: Reasonable accommodations are set for both employees of organizations and participants in activities and services provided by organizations. Your center must be accessible to people with disabilities, physically by providing access through architectural modifications and via communication by providing specific technology. If providing reasonable accommodation will cause excessive financial burden or will interfere excessively with the operation of the center, then accommodations may not need to be provided. Because these factors are based on individual situations, consult with experts if your center seems to incur this situation. Alternative Activities or Services: It is important to create and offer alternative activities or services for individuals when safety is a concern. Examples may be providing an individual rather than a group lesson for the rider who requires undivided attention. It may be providing sidewalkers with additional training in dealing with specific safety concerns. If a participant is considered to be unsafe for mounted equine activities, then activities such as ground work or grooming, round pen work, supervised barn chores or driving may be considered. The key is to encourage the individual and to show that the exclusion from riding at this time is not intended to discriminate against the individual but that it is a safety issue. If driving might be a safe alternative for this potential participant and your center does not provide driving, it is helpful to know of nearby programs of which you have references. Center may get sued for denying activities or services or may be accused of bias against an individual, even if the denial is appropriate. Developing your procedures with medical and legal counsel is the surest way of anticipating such challenges and providing services fairly to all. Standards for Certification & Accreditation 2018 177 Adaptive Tack Guidelines the top priority in all equine-assisted activities or therapies must be safety of the participant and the equine, regardless of the potential benefits for the participant. The first principle is always to do no harm, and any use of special equipment in equine-assisted activities or therapies must follow this principle. As the potential benefits of equine-assisted activities and therapies have become more widely accepted, more pressure is being brought to bear on programs to accommodate participants with increasingly severe disabilities. Accordingly, equipment that is designed to be more and more supportive has become available, necessitating guidelines for its safe and reasonable use. An instructor who plans to use any adaptive equipment should always try out such equipment him/herself, under a simulated lesson situation in a controlled manner, before allowing a participant to use it. Examples of limitations for which adaptive tack may be used to compensate include poor trunk control, weak hand grasp, poor leg control and loss of sensation in seat and feet. Before adaptive tack is used, the instructor/therapist should address the following questions: Is the original tack fitted correctly Precautions and contraindications that may apply include, but are not limited to , issues with poor head and trunk control, severe scoliosis, a high level of paralysis and complications of cerebral palsy including lack of range of motion of the hip.
This app aren t defect may be outweighed by several advantages sound has over other media. For one thing, sound is independent of light and th erefore can be used day or night. Accordingly, it does no t require a straight line of connection with the destination. I n most animals, the body alone produces sound - ordinarily, no tool is requisite. In the case of humans, it can also be modulated to vary from intimate whisper to long-distance shouting. In summarizing what is known of th e acoustic behaviour of ver tebrates, we can only scratch the surface here. Almost all instances are in the Teleosts, and th eir m e thods are of three distinct kinds: by stridulation of one hard part against another (grinding their tee th, for instance); by expulsion of gas (a sort of breathing sound); or by vibrating their gas bladder. Some fish hiss like a cat, some growl, some grunt like a pig; o th ers croak, snore, or croon; some bellow, purr, buzz, or whistle; one even vibrates like a drum. Most amphibians cannot hear and seldom produce any sound other than a weak squeak, but frogs and toads are quite no isy in highly diverse ways. Reptiles can in general hear Letter; yet few produce sounds (though crocodiles roar and grun t). Birds signify by sounds, given and received, but, more compre hensively, by so-called displays - stereotyped mo tor patterns involved in communication - which also include visual m ovements and posturing. Birds produce a huge varie ty of vocalizations, rang ing from short, monosyllabic calls, to long, complicated sequences, their songs. The communication systems of birds, which have been well studied for many centuries, 18 Signs: An Introduction to Semiotics are so h e terogeneous that they cannot be deal t with here ade quately. The same must be said of their mul tifarious, often daz zling, visible displays - stereotyped motor patterns - including their sometimes spectacular plumage. Mammals have elaborate auditory organs and rely on the sense of hearing more than do m embers of any o ther group, but they also, like many birds, communicate, if sporadically, by nonvocal m e thods as well. A familiar example of this is the drumming behav iour in the gorilla, produced by clenched fists beating on the chest. Echolocation refers to the phenomenon where the emitter and receiver of a train of soun ds is the same individual; this is found in bats as well as marine mammals, such as certain species of whales and dolphins. Attempts to teach language-like skills to apes or to any o ther ani mal s (such as captive m arin e mammals or pet birds) have been exte nsively criticized on the grounds that the Clever Hans effect, or fallacy, might have been a t work (as mentioned above). Since this ph enomenon has profound implications for (among other possible dyads) man-animal communications of all sorts, some account seems in order h e r. In brief, a stallion named Hans, Basic N o tions 19 in Berlin a t the turn o f the cen tury, was reputed to b e able to do arithm e tic and perform comparably impressive verbal feats, re sponding nonverbally to spoken or written questions put to him by tapping out th e correct answers with his foot. Ingenious tests even tually proved that the horse was in fact reacting to n onverbal cues unwittingly given by the questioner. Ever since that demonstration of h ow unintended cueing can affect an experime n t on animal behaviour, alert and responsible scientists have tried to exclude the som e times highly subtle perseverance of the effect. This is usually taken to include the e mulation of dangerous models by innocuous mimics in terms of visible or audi tory signals, or distasteful scen ts, in order to fool predators. In humans, decep tive communications in daily life have been studied by psycholo gists, and, on the stage, by professional m agicians. Various body parts may be mendaciously entailed, singly or in combination: gaze, pupil dilatio n, tears, winks, facial expression, smile or frown, gesture, posture, voice, e tc. A consideration of mainly acoustic even ts thus far should by n o means be taken for neglect of o ther channels in which nonverbal messages can be encoded, among the m chemical, o ptical, tactile, electric, and thermal. The chemical channel an tedates all the o th ers in evolution and is omnipresen t in all organisms. Plan ts in teract wi th o ther plants via the chemical channel, and with animals (especially insects, but humans as well), in addition to the usual contact chan nels, by optical means.
Yet, the next stage collects the redundant signals and uses a specialized synapse to further concentrate the message. So this redundancy at the ganglion cell output is accepted as a temporary measure. Although one spike encodes about 10-fold more bits than one quantum, the spike costs 100-fold more to generate in the ganglion cell and many times more to transmit centrally via the optic nerve. One strategy is to match ganglion cell arrays to the distribution of information in natural scenes. The Taoist circle also segments light and dark equally, and our visual sensations do not contradict this impression. Natural scenes actually contain more dark regions than bright ones (Laughlin, 1981; Richards, 1982). Thus, excitatory cone bipolar synapses upon ganglion cells serve as a final common pathway for both cone and rod signals. Moreover, there is a further benefit whose explication requires a step back to the bipolar neurons. Consequently, a depolarizing bright contrast can sharply increase its release, and a dark contrast can decrease it. This reinforces their rectification, further protecting them from encoding any bright information and preserving their full dynamic range for dark information. This reduces noise in the spike output, and thus mean spike rate, thereby increasing bits per spike (chapter 3). The benefits: fewer spikes, lower mean rate, and more bits per spike justify the cost of doubling the cell types (Renteria et al. This is no coincidence: crossover inhibition needs to be cospatial with direct excitation, so the collecting arbors for both the inhibitory and excitatory mechanisms should match (figure 11. And it effectively doubles the number of contacts that each circuit (cone or rod) can deliver to the available dendritic membrane (figure 11. Second, the day circuit that sums narrowly can enlarge at night to sum broadly with little extra cost. Third, excitatory synapses on the ganglion cell membrane can serve as a final common pathway for both shifts. Bipolar types deliver slowly changing signals to the inner synaptic layer via finer axons with fewer, slower synapses and deliver rapidly changing signals via thicker axons with more, faster synapses (Freed & Liang, 2010). Each bipolar type costratifies with a particular ganglion cell to transfer its portion of bandwidth (figure 11. This establishes a functional ganglion cell type-which requires a structure to match. A type that encodes high temporal frequencies cannot sum temporally to improve its S/N; therefore, it must sum spatially, and this requires a wide dendritic field. Conversely, a type that encodes low frequencies can sum temporally, so it can use a narrow dendritic field. In this design, bandwidth sets field size; field size sets cell spacing (2- rule); and spacing sets array structure-sparser for cells coding high temporal frequencies and denser for cells coding low temporal frequencies. Since cost per bit increases with spike rate and higher bandwidths entail higher rates (Koch et al. When these ganglion cell types view a nature video, fast features trigger bursts of quanta from fast bipolar cells and cause the brisktransient cell to spike. Fast features trigger no quanta from slow bipolar cells, so the local-edge cell is silent. Yet a slow feature (an edge slowly going dim-then-bright) triggers a burst of quanta from slow bipolar cells onto the small ganglion cell, and this evokes a few spikes (figure 11. If a narrow-field ganglion cell were to encode high temporal frequencies by collecting from fast bipolar cells, its limited spatial summation would reduce S/N and cause a noisier spike train. Conversely, if a broad-field ganglion cell were to encode low temporal frequencies, its spatial pooling (needed for high frequencies) would reduce certainty regarding the location and trajectory of the local edge; moreover, the spatially pooled slow signals would be redundant.
The direct approach is the truly superior one: Cover stories have proven effective in exactly these circumstances, and they can and should be used in an unbiased way. We showed that low-level factors must contribute to one such effect: African-American faces look darker than Caucasian faces even when the images are equated for mean luminance (Levin & Banaji 2006); however, when the faces are blurred, even subjects who do not appreciate race in the images still judge the African-American face to be darker than the Caucasian face (Firestone & Scholl 2015a), implying that low-level properties. Even those subjects who repeatedly showed no evidence of seeing race in the images (and indeed, even those subjects who explicitly thought the two images were of the same person) still judged the blurry AfricanAmerican face to be darker. For example, suppose that instead of blurring the images, we just replaced them with two homogeneous squares, one black and one white, and then we adapted Levin et al. In fact, we made this thought experiment an empirical reality, using 100 online subjects and the same parameters as Levin et al. All 100 subjects chose "AfricanAmerican" for the black square and "Caucasian" for the white square. Does it mean that "replacing the faces with homogeneous squares left some race-specifying information in the images" By contrast, their "demo" seemed like the best evidence they had found, and so we focused on it. A major theme throughout our project has been to focus not on "low-hanging fruit" but instead on the strongest, most influential, and best-supported cases we know of for top-down effects of cognition on perception. Pitfall 5: Peripheral attentional effects Using your best guess, how would you differentiate these squares by race If you had to choose, which of these squares would you label "African-American," and which would you label "Caucasian" Clark, for example, pointed to rich models of attention as "a deep, pervasive, and entirely nonperipheral player in the construction of human experience," and asked whether attention can be written off as "peripheral. That said, we find allusions to the notion that attention can "alter the balance between top-down prediction and bottom-up sensory evidence at every stage and level of processing" (Clark) to be a bit too abstract for our taste, and we wish that these commentaries had pointed to particular experimental demonstrations that they think could be explained only in terms of top-down effects. Without such concrete cases, florid appeals to the richness of attention are reminiscent of the appeals to neuroscience in section R2. In general, however, our claim is not that all forms of attention must be "peripheral" in the relevant sense. Rather, our claim is that at least some are merely peripheral, and that many alleged top-down effects on perception can be explained by those peripheral forms of attention. This is why Lupyan is mistaken in arguing that "Attentional effects can be dismissed if and only if attention simply 61 Downloaded from https:/ Across the core cases of attending to locations, features, and objects, both classical and contemporary theorizing understands that, fundamentally, "attention is a selective process" that modulates "early perceptual filters" (Carrasco 2011, pp. That is what we mean when we speak of attention as constraining input: Attention acts as a filter that selects the information for downstream visual processing, which may itself be impervious to cognitive influence. However, even if attention can go beyond this role and "alter the balance between top-down prediction and bottom-up sensory evidence at every stage and level of processing" (Clark), we find it odd to move from such sophisticated attentional processing to the further claim that perception is "cognitively penetrated" by attention (Raftopoulos). The controversy over top-down effects of cognition on perception is a controversy over the revolutionary possibility that what we see is directly altered by how we think, feel, act, speak, and so forth. Our project concerns the "joint" between perception and cognition, and attention unquestionably belongs on the perception side of this joint. If some continue to think of attention as a nonperceptual influence on what we see, they can do so; but to quote Block out of context, "If this is cognitive penetration, why should we care about cognitive penetration Moral words are identified more accurately than random nonmoral words, which led Gantman and Van Bavel (2014) to claim that "moral concerns shape our basic awareness" (p. However, the moral words in these studies were semantically related to each other. Sure enough, you can obtain "pop-out" effects with any arbitrary category of related words (Firestone & Scholl 2015b), including fashion. Whereas some of the empirical case studies we have explored turn on subtle details that may be open to interpretation, the "moral pop-out" case study has always seemed to us to be clear, unsubtle, and unusually decisive (and we have been pleased to see that others concur;. However, their responses respectively (1) mischaracterize our challenge, (2) cannot possibly account for our results, and (3) bet on possibilities that are already known to be empirically false. We briefly elaborate on each of these challenges: First, Gantman & Van Bavel write, "F&S recently claimed that semantic memory must be solely responsible for the moral pop-out effect because the moral words were more related to each other than the control words were. Nevertheless, we actively tested this alternative empirically: When we ran the relevant experiments, semantic relatedness in fact produced analogous pop-out effects.
Reading comprehension skill, reading word recognition, oral reading skill, and performance of tasks requiring reading may all be affected. Spelling difficulties are frequently associated with specific reading disorder and often remain into adolescence even after some progress in reading has been made. Associated emotional and behavioural disturbances are common during the school age period. The deficit concerns mastery of basic computational skills of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division rather than of the more abstract mathematical skills involved in algebra, trigonometry, geometry, or calculus. Nevertheless, in most cases a careful clinical examination shows marked neurodevelopmental immaturities such as choreiform movements of unsupported limbs or mirror movements and other associated motor features, as well as signs of impaired fine and gross motor coordination. This mixed category should be used only when there is a major overlap between each of these specific developmental disorders. The disorders are usually, but not always, associated with some degree of general impairment of cognitive functions. Pervasive developmental disorders A group of disorders characterized by qualitative abnormalities in reciprocal social interactions and in patterns of communication, and by a restricted, stereotyped, repetitive repertoire of interests and activities. Use additional code, if desired, to identify any associated medical condition and mental retardation. Childhood autism A type of pervasive developmental disorder that is defined by: (a) the presence of abnormal or impaired development that is manifest before the age of three years, and (b) the characteristic type of abnormal functioning in all the three areas of psychopathology: reciprocal social interaction, communication, and restricted, stereotyped, repetitive behaviour. In addition to these specific diagnostic features, a range of other nonspecific problems are common, such as phobias, sleeping and eating disturbances, temper tantrums, and (self-directed) aggression. This subcategory should be used when there is abnormal and impaired development that is present only after age three years, and a lack of sufficient demonstrable abnormalities in one or two of the three areas of psychopathology required for the diagnosis of autism (namely, reciprocal social interactions, communication, and restricted, stereotyped, repetitive behaviour) in spite of characteristic abnormalities in the other area(s). Atypical autism arises most often in profoundly retarded individuals and in individuals with a severe specific developmental disorder of receptive language. Atypical childhood psychosis Mental retardation with autistic features Use additional code (F70-F79), if desired, to identify mental retardation. Loss of purposive hand movements, hand-wringing stereotypies, and hyperventilation are characteristic. Social and play development are arrested but social interest tends to be maintained. Trunk ataxia and apraxia start to develop by age four years and choreoathetoid movements frequently follow. Typically, this is accompanied by a general loss of interest in the environment, by stereotyped, repetitive motor mannerisms, and by autistic-like abnormalities in social interaction and communication. In some cases the disorder can be shown to be due to some associated encephalopathy but the diagnosis should be made on the behavioural features. In adolescence, the overactivity tends to be replaced by underactivity (a pattern that is not usual in hyperkinetic children with normal intelligence). This syndrome is also often associated with a variety of developmental delays, either specific or global. It differs from autism primarily in the fact that there is no general delay or retardation in language or in cognitive development. There is a strong tendency for the abnormalities to persist into adolescence and adult life. Hyperkinetic children are often reckless and impulsive, prone to accidents, and find themselves in disciplinary trouble because of unthinking breaches of rules rather than deliberate defiance. Their relationships with adults are often socially disinhibited, with a lack of normal caution and reserve. Impairment of cognitive functions is common, and specific delays in motor and language development are disproportionately frequent. Such behaviour should amount to major violations of age-appropriate social expectations; it should therefore be more severe than ordinary childish mischief or adolescent rebelliousness and should imply an enduring pattern of behaviour (six months or longer). Features of conduct disorder can also be symptomatic of other psychiatric conditions, in which case the underlying diagnosis should be 565 F90.
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